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COMMENT 
 
JUVENILE IN JUSTICE: A LOOK AT MARYLAND’S PRACTICE 
OF INCARCERATING CHILDREN WITHOUT A JURY TRIAL 
KELSEY ROBINSON* 
 
A juvenile “receives the worst of both worlds: . . . neither the protections accorded 
to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for 
children.”1 
 
In Maryland, if Shane is arrested and charged the day before his 
eighteenth birthday with malicious destruction of property for throwing a 
rock at a vehicle, he will be adjudicated as a delinquent.2  In this case, Shane 
is not entitled to a jury trial.3  However, if Shane is arrested for this same 
crime on the day of his eighteenth birthday, then he will be charged as an 
adult4 and is entitled to a jury trial because the offense he is charged with 
permits imprisonment for a period of more than ninety days.5  Yet Shane—
merely because he is considered a juvenile for the charge when he is 
seventeen years, 364-days-old—is not afforded the protection of a jury trial 
if he is charged before his birthday.6  Since the juvenile court has jurisdiction 
over Shane until he is twenty-one-years-old, Shane faces a possible period of 
incarceration of three years when adjudicated delinquent.7  Yet when charged 
as an adult, Shane faces a period of incarceration that is at most one year.8 
                                                          
© 2020 Kelsey Robinson. 
 *   J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  The 
author wishes to thank the editors of the Maryland Law Review, particularly Andrew White, Lauren 
Fash, and Bianca Spinosa for their dedication to editing this paper.  She thanks Professor David 
Gray for being her faculty advisor and sharing his insights and knowledge.  Finally, the author 
would like to dedicate this Comment to her parents, Craig and Connie Robinson, for their 
unwavering love and support. 
 1.  Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).  
 2.  See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-03 (West 2011) (excluding malicious 
destruction of property as a crime under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction). 
 3.  See id. § 3-8A-13(g) (“The court shall try cases without a jury.”). 
 4.  MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 6-302 (West 2002). 
 5.  CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-302(e)(2).  In the adult criminal system, a person convicted of 
malicious destruction of property for throwing an object at a vehicle faces up to one-year 
incarceration.  CRIM. LAW § 6-302. 
 6.  See CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-01(c)–(d) (defining an adult as “an individual who is at 
least [eighteen] years old” and a child as “an individual under the age of [eighteen] years”). 
 7.  CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-24.  
 8.  CRIM. LAW § 6-302(b). 
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 This Comment will argue that because juveniles adjudicated delinquent 
in Maryland are subject to incarceration upon disposition and thus at risk of 
losing their liberty, they are constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.  Depriving 
juveniles the right to a jury trial violates Article 21 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights, which specifies “[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, 
every man hath a right to . . . trial by an impartial jury.”9  It also violates 
Article 24, which states that “no man ought to be . . . imprisoned or disseized 
of his freehold liberties . . . or, in any manner, . . . deprived of his . . . 
liberty . . . but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.”10  
Because juveniles are deprived of their liberty when they are, in effect, 
prosecuted and incarcerated, they are constitutionally entitled to a jury trial 
under the Declaration of Rights.11 
Part I of this Comment will discuss the constitutional protections that 
the Supreme Court of the United States has extended to juveniles and will 
explore the relevant history of the juvenile system, particularly in 
Maryland.12  It further will provide an overview on the important role that 
jury trials have in the criminal legal system.13  Part II will examine how 
judicial discretion, conditions of confinement, excessive sentences, and the 
lack of a jury trial right, violates Articles 21 and 24 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights.14  Part II will also evaluate the policy justifications for 
allowing juveniles in Maryland the right to a jury trial and will examine the 
rationales of other jurisdictions that have granted juveniles the right to a jury 
trial and will apply those rationales to Maryland to conclude that Maryland 
law does entitle a juvenile the right to a jury trial.15 
I.  BACKGROUND 
It has long been held that juveniles facing delinquent charges are entitled 
to some of the same constitutional protections that adults facing criminal 
charges are entitled to,16 despite the consensus among state courts that 
juvenile proceedings are not criminal proceedings.17  In Maryland, the state 
constitutional protections afforded to defendants in criminal proceedings are 
                                                          
 9.  MD. CONST. art. 21. 
 10.  MD. CONST. art. 24.  “We long ago determined that the phrase, ‘the Law of the land,’ 
‘mean[s] the same thing’ as ‘due process of law’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.”  Clark v. State, 364 Md. 611, 644, 774 A.2d 1136, 1155 (2001) (quoting Balt. Belt 
R.R. v. Baltzell, 75 Md. 94, 99, 23 A. 74, 74 (1891)). 
 11.  See infra Part II. 
 12.  See infra Part I. 
 13.  See infra Part I. 
 14.  See infra Part II. 
 15.  See infra Part II. 
 16.  See infra Section I.A. 
 17.  See, e.g., In re S.B., 903 N.E.2d 1175, 1178 (Ohio 2009) (“Juvenile delinquency 
proceedings are civil . . . proceedings.”); State v. Thompson, 998 P.2d 762, 767 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) 
(“[J]uvenile adjudications are not criminal proceedings . . . .”). 
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found in Articles 21 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.18  
Juveniles are entitled to all of these constitutional protections, except for the 
right to a jury trial.19 
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,20 the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that the right to a jury trial did not extend to juveniles.21  Despite the 
holding in McKeiver, several states granted juveniles the right to a jury trial 
during the adjudicatory phase of a juvenile proceeding on the ground that 
their respective state constitution afforded juveniles the procedural protection 
of a jury trial.22  In Maryland, this issue has not been considered since 
McKeiver was decided.23  This Part will proceed in four sections.  Section A 
discusses the constitutional protections afforded to juveniles by the Supreme 
Court.  Section B explores the history of Maryland’s juvenile system.  Section 
C discusses Maryland’s modern juvenile system.  Finally, Section D 
describes the role that jury trials have in the American criminal legal system, 
both federally24 and in Maryland.25 
A.  Creating the Foundation: Supreme Court Jurisprudence for 
Protecting Juveniles 
Although juvenile court systems have been operating since 1899,26 
constitutional due process protections for juveniles were not considered until 
the late 1960s when courts began to question whether the promises of 
rehabilitation and treatment were being fulfilled.27  The parens patriae 
doctrine—a “[s]tate’s interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of 
its citizenry”28—was not being carried out as designed, with “a fatherly judge 
                                                          
 18.  See MD. CONST. arts. 21, 24. 
 19.  See infra Section II.A.4. 
 20.  403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
 21.  Id. at 545. 
 22.  See infra Section II.C. 
 23.  See infra text accompanying note 80. 
 24.  See infra Section I.D.1. 
 25.  See infra Section I.D.2. 
 26.  See infra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 27. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (noting that although the original 
purposes of the juvenile courts may have been aligned with a non-punitive, non-adult ideology, 
“critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to whether actual performance measures well 
enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of 
constitutional guaranties applicable to adults”).  A task force report for the District of Columbia 
alerted the Court to failed rehabilitation efforts, measured by recidivism rates: 
In fiscal 1966 approximately [sixty-six] percent of the [sixteen]- and [seventeen]-year-
old juveniles referred to the court . . . had been before the court previously. . . .  [Sixty-
one] percent of the sample Juvenile Court referrals in 1965 had been previously referred 
at least once and that [forty-two] percent had been referred at least twice before. 
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON CRIME IN D.C., REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 773 (1966); infra notes 32–43 and accompanying text (describing the 
movement to grant juveniles rights in juvenile trials). 
 28.  Wolinski v. Browneller, 115 Md. App. 285, 300, 693 A.2d 30, 37 (1997). 
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touch[ing] the heart and conscience of the erring youth by talking over his 
problems.”29  It was only after the Supreme Court recognized “that the child 
receives the worst of both worlds,” that certain constitutional protections 
were viewed as fundamental for juveniles.30 
Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court began 
developing procedural protections for juveniles.31  The starting point was In 
re Gault,32 where juveniles received due process protections for the first 
time.33  In Gault, fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault was arrested for making lewd 
comments, but Gerald’s parents were not notified that their son had been 
arrested.34  The petition alleging Gerald’s delinquent acts was not served on 
his parents.35  Further, at his adjudication hearing, the complainant was not 
present to be cross-examined.36  At the conclusion of the hearing, Gerald was 
committed to a juvenile detention facility until he turned twenty-one-years-
old.37  The Supreme Court held that juveniles had the constitutional right to 
timely and adequate written notice,38 the right to counsel,39 the right to 
confrontation and cross-examination,40 and the privilege against self-
incrimination.41  The Court reasoned that juveniles were constitutionally 
entitled to these rights because they faced incarceration if found to be 
delinquent.42  The Court stressed that “[t]he essential difference between 
Gerald’s case and a normal criminal case is that safeguards available to adults 
were discarded in Gerald’s case.”43 
                                                          
 29.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967). 
 30.  Kent, 383 U.S. at 556; see infra notes 32–53 and accompanying text. 
 31.  See infra notes 32–53 and accompanying text. 
 32.  387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 33.  Id. at 30–31. 
 34.  Id. at 4–5. 
 35.  Id. at 5. 
 36.  Id. at 6. 
 37.  Id. at 7. 
 38.  Id. at 33–34 (“Due process of law requires notice . . . which would be deemed 
constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding.”). 
 39.  Id. at 41 (“[T]he Due Process Clause . . . requires that in . . . proceedings . . . which may 
result in [incarceration] in which the juvenile’s freedom is curtailed, the child . . . must be notified 
of the child’s right to be represented by counsel . . . .”). 
 40.  Id. at 56 (“No reason is suggested or appears for a different rule in respect of sworn 
testimony in juvenile courts than in adult tribunals. . . .  [C]onfrontation and sworn testimony by 
witnesses available for cross-examination [are] essential for a finding of ‘delinquency’ . . . .”). 
 41.  Id. at 49–50 (“[J]uvenile proceedings[,] . . . which may lead to commitment to a state 
institution, must be regarded as ‘criminal’ for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination.  
To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the ‘civil’ 
label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings.”). 
 42.  Id. at 50 (“[C]ommitment is a deprivation of liberty.  It is incarceration against one’s will, 
whether it is called ‘criminal’ or ‘civil.’”). 
 43.  Id. at 29; see also id. (“The summary procedure as well as the long commitment was 
possible because Gerald was [fifteen] years of age instead of over [eighteen].”). 
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In In re Winship,44 the Supreme Court held that proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt was required in juvenile adjudication hearings.45  In 
Winship, a twelve-year-old boy was found to be delinquent for stealing 
money.46  The delinquency petition asserted that the child’s charge of larceny 
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, and while the juvenile 
court recognized that the proof present in the case might not establish guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, it rejected the child’s argument that the 
Fourteenth Amendment required such proof in juvenile cases.47 
Prior to the Winship decision, the standard in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings nationwide was preponderance of the evidence.48  The Court 
emphasized that criminal charges required a higher burden of persuasion than 
civil cases.49  Since a defendant’s autonomy and freedom are at stake in a 
criminal proceeding, the Constitution requires that evidence be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.50  Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan 
reasoned that “[t]he same considerations that demand extreme caution in 
factfinding to protect the . . . adult apply as well to the . . . child.”51  Rejecting 
the lower courts’ interpretations of the issue, the majority emphasized that 
the potential loss of liberty in a delinquency disposition was “comparable in 
seriousness to a felony prosecution.”52  Justice Brennan concluded that a 
reasonable doubt standard would not require states to “abandon or displace” 
the fundamental principles of the juvenile delinquency system.53 
After Gault and Winship, the Supreme Court stopped extending 
constitutional rights to juveniles.54  In the seminal case of McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania, the majority held that trial by jury was not a constitutional 
requirement in the adjudicative phase of juvenile proceedings.55  Writing for 
the majority, Justice Blackmun reasoned that not all rights constitutionally 
guaranteed for adults applied to juveniles.56  For example, because the 
                                                          
 44.  397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
 45.  Id. at 368 (stating the standard “is as much required during the adjudicatory stage of a 
delinquency proceeding as are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault”). 
 46.  Id. at 360. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. at 372. 
 50.  Id. at 363–64 (noting that in a prosecution, the criminally accused “has at stake interests of 
immense importance”). 
 51.  Id. at 365. 
 52.  Id. at 365–66 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967)) (“We made clear . . . that civil 
labels . . . do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile 
courts . . . .” (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 36)). 
 53.  Id. at 367 (citing Gault, 387 U.S. at 21). 
 54.  See infra notes 55–65 and accompanying text. 
 55.  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).  The Court did, however, state in 
dicta that individual states were free to develop a jury trial system for juveniles should they so 
choose.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 545. 
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standard of a juvenile’s due process rights was fundamental fairness and a 
jury was not required under fundamental fairness,57 then juveniles were not 
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.58  The McKeiver majority reasoned 
that a juvenile jury trial would “place the juvenile squarely in the routine of 
the criminal process,”59 turning delinquency proceedings into a fully 
adversarial system.60  The Court thought that the juvenile system could not 
fulfill its rehabilitative goals with a jury trial,61 not because a jury had the 
potential to be harsher on a child than a judge would be, but because 
rehabilitation would be impeded by the technical consequences of a jury trial, 
including “the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the 
adversary system.”62 
In his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the Sixth Amendment, made 
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, required a jury trial in 
juvenile cases because these acts would be punishable if committed by an 
adult, who would be entitled to a jury trial.63  Justice Douglas reasoned that 
as a consequence juvenile proceedings were indeed prosecutions for criminal 
acts that could result in the juvenile being confined until the age of twenty-
one.64  Justice Douglas concluded his dissent by noting that “‘the real 
traumatic’ experience of incarceration without due process is ‘the feeling of 
being deprived of basic rights.’”65 
                                                          
 57.  The Court has not explicitly defined this term, but has stated that “a person . . . would be 
at a severe . . . disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he could be adjudged 
guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same evidence as would suffice in a civil 
case.”  Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (citation omitted). 
 58.  McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543.  The Supreme Court established that fundamental fairness is 
“the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings.”  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 547. 
 60.  Id. at 545 (reasoning that by allowing jury trials, there would be no need for a separate 
juvenile system because an adversarial process would “put an effective end to what has been the . . . 
intimate, informal protective proceeding”). 
 61.  Id. at 547 (stating that the success of the juvenile system depends in large part on the 
availability of resources and the dedication of the public to rehabilitating youth offenders, and that 
in order to reach the highest success rates, states should be allowed to experiment as they see fit, 
without a jury trial requirement “impeding that experimentation”). 
 62.  Id. at 550. 
 63.  Id. at 560–61 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the children in the cases faced a possible 
minimum five-year sentence, and stressing that “[n]o adult could be denied a jury trial in those 
circumstances”). 
 64.  Id. at 558–59 (noting the discrepancy in the cases where “[t]he trial judge stated that the 
hearings were juvenile hearings, not criminal trials.  But the issue in each case was whether they 
had violated a state criminal law.”). 
 65.  Id. at 562 (citation omitted). 
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B.  Establishing the Juvenile Causes Act: History of Maryland’s 
Juvenile Justice System 
Historically, Maryland did not distinguish between the treatment and 
punishment of juveniles and adults within the criminal legal system.66  “All 
persons, regardless of age, had an absolute right to a jury trial for all but petty 
offenses.”67  Chicago created the country’s first juvenile court system in 
1899,68 and Maryland followed in 1902.69  The new system was created to 
ensure that the juvenile court applied the parens patriae doctrine to juvenile 
proceedings by focusing on the youth’s “need for protection or 
rehabilitation,” rather than on the youth’s guilt.70 
In 1969, the Maryland General Assembly passed a comprehensive set 
of laws, known today as the Juvenile Causes Act and codified at Annotated 
Code of Maryland, Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,  
section 3-8A,71 to further protect the rights of juveniles in court.72  The 
overarching goal of the Juvenile Causes Act is to rehabilitate youthful 
offenders so that they can become productive members of society.73  The 
Court of Special Appeals found that in so passing this Act, the legislature 
intended to retain the principles that the juvenile system was founded upon 
and preserve juvenile proceedings as non-punitive.74  That same year, but two 
years before the McKeiver decision, the Court of Appeals held in In re 
Johnson75 that juveniles in Maryland had no right to a jury trial.76  The court 
reasoned that while the majority in Gault held that due process standards 
were applicable to juvenile proceedings, the Gault majority did not “say that 
all of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights need necessarily be applicable” to 
juvenile proceedings.77 
                                                          
 66.  In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 521, 255 A.2d 419, 421 (1969) (explaining that “children were 
treated as persons.  Children under the age of seven . . . were incapable of criminal intent . . . .  
Children above that age were treated as adults.  They were given the same legal protections and the 
same punishments as adults.”). 
 67.  Id. (citing Danner v. State, 89 Md. 220, 42 A.965 (1889)). 
 68.  Id. at 522, 255 A.2d at 422 (“The reform movement brought about the enactment of special 
statutory provisions for the handling of juvenile offenders.  Illinois, which adopted its Juvenile Court 
Act in 1899 . . . was the first to embrace the reform . . . .”). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71. MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A (West 2011).  
 72. In re Johnson, 254 Md. at 523, 255 A.2d at 422.  See Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 155 Md. App. 
580, 598, 843 A.2d 915, 926 (2004) (“Under the Juvenile Causes Act, juveniles who, in the absence 
of the juvenile justice system, would be prosecuted in, and punished by, the adult criminal justice 
system, are instead afforded supervision and treatment, with the aim to achieve rehabilitation.”). 
 73.  Lopez-Sanchez, 155 Md. App. at 598, 843 A.2d at 926. 
 74.  In re Hamill, 10 Md. App. 586, 590, 271 A.2d 762, 764 (1970). 
 75.  254 Md. 517, 255 A.2d 419 (1969). 
 76.  Id. at 531, 255 A.2d at 426. 
 77.  Id. at 524–25, 255 A.2d at 423 (alteration in original). 
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In 1967, fourteen-year-old Thomas Johnson was found to be delinquent 
for allegedly striking and kicking a police officer.78  Johnson filed a motion 
for a jury trial, which was denied, and was placed on indefinite probation.79  
As the seminal appellate decision addressing the right to a juvenile jury trial, 
both before and after the McKeiver decision, the Johnson court held that 
Maryland’s statutory scheme creating the system of juvenile courts was not 
unconstitutional for its failure to provide for a jury trial.80  The court did 
acknowledge, however, the shortcomings of the juvenile system and its need 
for reform.81  The court even recognized that the right to a jury trial in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings could one day become practice in Maryland.82 
In 1997, the Juvenile Causes Act was amended.83  This amendment 
transformed the goals of Maryland’s juvenile system from mere 
rehabilitation to a combination of goals, including public safety and juvenile 
accountability.84  Despite this shift in ideology, Maryland’s highest court still 
considered the juvenile system to be civil, while acknowledging that 
juveniles were still afforded some of the constitutional protections that adults 
were afforded in criminal cases.85  Retaining the due process and fair 
treatment principles from Gault, the Court of Appeals applied the 
fundamental fairness standard, and concluded that juveniles in Maryland 
have the constitutional right to a speedy trial.86  At this point, juveniles are 
entitled to all of the constitutional rights afforded to adults through the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights, except for the right to a jury trial.87 
                                                          
 78.  Id. at 519, 255 A.2d at 420. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 517, 255 A.2d at 419. 
 81.  Id. at 524, 255 A.2d at 423 (observing that in spite of the attempt to create a juvenile system 
that reformers originally imagined, “a wave of disenchantment has been developing for more than 
a decade—the result of public awareness . . . that there is substantial opinion that major revisions of 
the system are in order”). 
 82.  Id. at 531, 255 A.2d at 426 (“Such a mechanism is not without a certain attractiveness, and 
could some day become a part of our juvenile practice.”). 
 83.  MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A (West 2011).  
 84.  See generally  CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02 (describing the purposes of the juvenile 
system); see also In re Saifu K., 187 Md. App. 395, 409, 978 A.2d 881, 889 (2009) (“According to 
bill analyses[,] . . . the 1997 amendment ‘change[d] the purpose of juvenile justice law from that of 
protectiveness of children committing delinquent act[s] to one that requires that children be held 
responsible for their behavior and accountable to the victim and the community for offenses 
committed.’”). 
 85.  In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 69, 763 A.2d 136, 146 (2000). 
 86.  In re Thomas J., 375 Md. 50, 70, 811 A.2d 310, 322 (2002). 
 87.  See CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-13(g). 
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C. The Pledge to Rehabilitate Youthful Offenders: Modern Juvenile 
System in Maryland 
The juvenile system seeks to balance the goals of public safety, 
rehabilitation, and accountability of the child.88  The current juvenile system 
in Maryland has procedures, policies, and standards that are outlined in the 
Maryland Code.89  The Department of Juvenile Services (“DJS”), the state 
agency that oversees juvenile detention and incarceration, proffers that it 
strives to maintain this balance, by “keep[ing] committed and detained youth 
safe while delivering services to meet youth needs.”90 
The specific language of Maryland’s juvenile statutory scheme has 
retained the non-adversarial principles from McKeiver.91  For example, 
phrases such as “[a]djudicatory hearing,”92 “[d]elinquent act,”93 and 
“[d]isposition hearing”94 are used.  Further, the charging document is called 
a “[p]etition”95 and the alleged delinquent child is called a “[r]espondent.”96  
The purposes and goals of the juvenile legal system includes a balance, as 
discussed above, of public safety, accountability, and character 
development.97 
Once a juvenile is found delinquent, a disposition is held to determine 
what level of rehabilitation the juvenile needs and to consider public safety.98  
The court has different options, ranging from putting the child on probation 
to committing the child to DJS for an out-of-home placement.99  Although a 
child in the custody of DJS may not be ordered to be detained for more than 
three years, the court or other invested party may move to renew the order.100  
                                                          
 88.  See infra notes 89–97 and accompanying text. 
 89.  See generally CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-02 (describing the purposes of Maryland’s 
juvenile system).  
 90.  DEP’T OF JUVENILE SERVS., DJS 2017–2020 STRATEGIC PLAN 4 (2017) [hereinafter DJS 
STRATEGIC PLAN]. 
 91.  See infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text; see also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 
U.S. 528, 550 (1971) (describing how providing juveniles with the right to a trial by jury would turn 
juvenile proceedings into an adversarial process, necessarily demonstrating that the McKeiver 
majority considered juvenile proceedings to be non-adversarial). 
 92.  See CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-01(b) (“‘Adjudicatory hearing’ means a hearing . . . to 
determine whether the allegations in the petition . . . are true.”). 
 93.  See id. § 3-8A-01(l) (“‘Delinquent act’ means an act which would be a crime if committed 
by an adult.”). 
 94.  See id. § 3-8A-01(p) (“‘Disposition hearing’ means a hearing under this subtitle to 
determine: (1) Whether a child needs or requires guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation; and if so (2) 
The nature of the guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation.”). 
 95.  Id. § 3-8A-01(y). 
 96.  Id. § 3-8A-01(aa). 
 97.  Id. § 3-8A-02(a)(1)(i)–(iii); see supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.  
 98.  CTS. & JUD. PROC. §  3-8A-19(c). 
 99.  Id. § 3-8A-19(d)(1)(i)–(ii). 
 100.  Id. § 3-8A-24(b). 
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The only other restriction to detaining a child is that the juvenile court’s 
jurisdiction terminates when the child turns twenty-one.101 
DJS owns and operates facilities statewide, some of which are called 
“committed placement” facilities.102  There are two types of committed 
placement facilities.103  First, “hardware secure” is “[a] facility that relies 
primarily on the use of construction and hardware such as locks, bars, and 
fences to restrict freedom.”104  Second, a “staff secure” facility is a 
“[r]esidential program[] where youth movement is controlled by staff 
supervision.”105  In 2007, seventeen-year-old Isaiah Simmons, III died at a 
staff secure facility after being restrained by staff members.106  In 2018, the 
juvenile court in Maryland committed 825 youth to DJS.107  The average 
length of stay in a secure committed placement was 169 days.108 
D. Protecting the Criminally Accused: Fundamental Right to Trial by 
Jury 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,109 and Articles 5, 21, 23, 
and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights110 provide Maryland residents 
accused of criminal wrongdoing with the right to a jury trial. 
1.  Fundamental Principles: Federal Constitutional Right 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . trial, 
by an impartial jury.”111  The Supreme Court has since evaluated this right 
according to the seriousness of the offense,112 holding that certain crimes 
considered to be petty are not subject to the jury trial provision.113  Applying 
this standard, the Court has held that an alleged offender who is charged with 
an offense must be facing an incarceration period of at least six months to be 
                                                          
 101.  Id. § 3-8A-24(c). 
 102.  DEP’T OF JUVENILE SERVS., DOORS TO DETENTION: STATEWIDE DETENTION 
UTILIZATION STUDY 7 (2013).  Committed placement facilities are facilities where youth are 
detained after they have been adjudicated delinquent.  Id. at 8. 
 103.  See infra text accompanying notes 104–105. 
 104.  DEP’T OF JUVENILE SERVS., DATA RESOURCE GUIDE FISCAL YEAR 2018 ix (2018) 
[hereinafter DJS DATA RESOURCE GUIDE]. 
 105.  Id. at xi. 
 106.  State v. Kanavy, 416 Md. 1, 5, 4 A.3d 991, 993 (2010). 
 107.  MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY., H.B. 1344, FISCAL & POLICY NOTE, REG. SESS. (2019), 
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/Details/hb1344/?ys=2019rs. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  See infra Section I.D.1. 
 110.  See infra Section I.D.2. 
 111.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 112.  Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 325 (1996). 
 113.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968). 
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entitled to a jury trial.114  The Court reasoned the penalty authorized for a 
particular crime is what matters and not the penalty actually imposed.115  
When evaluating the seriousness of the offense, courts must consider the 
maximum prison term authorized, on the ground that a longer prison sentence 
deprives a person of their liberty more than a shorter sentence.116 
2. In Pari Materia to the Sixth Amendment: Maryland Constitutional 
Right 
Maryland’s Declaration of Rights grants the accused the right to a jury 
trial in criminal proceedings.117  The legislature has interpreted this right to 
mean that an individual must be charged with a crime that provides for 
punishment of at least ninety days incarceration in order to be entitled to a 
jury trial.118  Legislative history reveals that one reason for the ninety-day 
threshold is “to reduce the number of jury trial prayers.”119 
Maryland appellate courts have interpreted what types of crimes allow 
for the constitutional right to a jury trial to attach.120  Maryland’s highest court 
has created a three-factor test to help trial courts determine whether there is 
a state constitutional right to a jury trial for a particular offense.121  These 
three factors establish that the right to a jury trial does not attach to certain 
                                                          
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 160 (internal quotation and citation omitted) (“[T]he defendant was jailed for [sixty] 
days, but it was the [ninety]-day authorized punishment on which the Court focused in determining 
that the offense was not one for which the Constitution assured trial by jury.”). 
 116.  Lewis, 518 U.S. at 326 (“While penalties such as probation . . . may infringe on a 
defendant’s freedom, the deprivation of liberty imposed by imprisonment makes that penalty the 
best indicator of whether the legislature considered an offense to be ‘petty’ or ‘serious.’”). 
 117.  See MD. CONST. art. 5(a) (“That the [i]nhabitants of Maryland are entitled to . . . trial by 
Jury . . . .”); MD. CONST. art. 21 (“That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to a 
speedy trial by an impartial jury . . . .”); MD. CONST. art. 23 (“In the trial of all criminal cases, the 
Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact . . . .”); MD. CONST. art. 24 (explaining due 
process as “no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties . . . or, in 
any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers”). 
 118.  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-302(e)(2)(i) (West 2009). 
 119.  MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, H.B. 615 FISCAL AND POLICY NOTE, REG. SESS. 2 (2004), 
http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Search/Legislation?target=/2004rs/billfile/hb0615.htm 
(“By establishing a [ninety]-day penalty threshold, the [legislature] attempted to distinguish petty 
offenses that under common law . . . did not trigger the right to be tried by a jury from other offenses 
to which the constitutional right applied.  The [legislature] was trying to define the circumstances 
under which a defendant did not have a right to a jury trial . . . in order to reduce the number of jury 
trial prayers.”). 
 120.  Cf. State v. Stafford, 160 Md. 385, 387, 153 A.77, 78 (1931) (ruling that the right to a jury 
trial attaches to the offenses of assault and battery).  But see In re Glenn, 54 Md. 572, 606 (1880) 
(reasoning that there is no right to a jury trial for the offense of vagrancy). 
 121.  Fisher v. State, 305 Md. 357, 365–66, 504 A.2d 626, 629–30 (1986).  These factors include 
whether the offense has historically been tried before juries or subject to summary jurisdiction; 
whether the offense is an infamous crime; and the seriousness of the offense.  Id. 
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minor criminal offenses.122  The legislature has defined this to include any 
offense for which the period of incarceration is not more than ninety days.123 
The Court of Appeals has established that “[u]nless there is good reason 
to do otherwise,” the constitutional provisions of the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights “are in pari materia with their federal counterparts.”124  Thus, the 
provisions of the Maryland Declaration of Rights are parallel to federal 
constitutional provisions.125  The court did emphasize, however, that pari 
materia  “does not mean that the [state] provision will always be interpreted 
or applied” in the same way that the parallel federal provision will be 
interpreted or applied.126  Indeed, where fundamental fairness is concerned, 
the Court of Appeals has interpreted both Article 21127 and Article 24 “more 
broadly”128 than the Fourteenth Amendment.129 
Under Articles 21 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 
individuals charged with a crime have the right to notice, counsel, 
confrontation and cross-examination, a speedy trial, and an impartial jury.130  
Both Maryland, through legislation,131 and the Supreme Court, through 
seminal precedent,132 maintain that juveniles are entitled to all of these rights, 
except for the right to a jury trial. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Under the Maryland Declaration of Rights, juveniles should be granted 
all constitutional protections afforded to adults.133  Since juveniles 
adjudicated delinquent are subject to incarceration upon disposition, they are 
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial.134  For juveniles facing confinement, 
                                                          
 122.  Kawamura v. State, 299 Md. 276, 291, 473 A.2d 438, 446 (1984) (noting that nonetheless, 
“the state constitutional jury trial right does attach . . . to offenses which historically had been tried 
before juries.  It also attaches to . . . any offense subject to infamous punishment.”). 
 123.  CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-302(e)(2)(i). 
 124.  Allmond v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 448 Md. 592, 609, 141 A.3d 57, 67 (2016) 
(internal quotation and citation omitted). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Dua v. Comcast Cable, 370 Md. 604, 621, 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (2002) (emphasis in 
original). 
 127.  See Perry v. State, 357 Md. 37, 86 n.11, 741 A.2d 1162, 1188 n.11 (1999) (resolving the 
law under Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, while noting that “[i]f the Supreme 
Court were to rule upon the issue, . . . we certainly would give due and respectful consideration to 
it in any future construction of Article 21, but it would not serve, on its own, to alter the declaration 
made in this Opinion regarding Article 21”). 
 128.  Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91, 175, 786 A.2d 631, 681 (2001) (Raker, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
 129.  See Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 43, 553 A.2d 233, 242–43 (1989) (affording individuals 
accused of crimes with a broader protection than that afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 130.  MD. CONST. art. 21. 
 131.  See supra Section I.C. 
 132.  See supra Section I.A. 
 133.  See infra Section II.A.4. 
 134.  See supra text accompanying notes 9–11. 
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juvenile proceedings are equivalent to criminal proceedings, so juveniles 
must be presented with all of the same criminal procedural safeguards as 
adults.135  Further, it is “disingenuous” for scholars to maintain that juvenile 
courts do not pursue retribution.136  Maryland has acknowledged that “a 
juvenile committed to a State facility suffers a deprivation of liberty and is 
entitled to constitutional protections.”137 
Applying the pari materia doctrine and the precedent from Gault to 
Articles 21 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, juveniles must be 
afforded the opportunity for a jury trial.138  In Gault, the Court noted that 
because juveniles are in danger of losing their liberty, juvenile proceedings 
are “comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution.”139  If the magnitude 
of the outcome for juveniles in adjudicatory proceedings is so acute as to 
bring into play all other due process protections, then it must also necessarily 
be the case, “by force of the same reasoning,” that the jury trial right be 
invoked in juvenile proceedings, which in no manner could “be classified as 
a less vital instrument” than the other due process protections.140 
Denying juveniles the right to a jury trial hinders the goals enumerated 
in the Maryland Code.141  In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, Justice Brennan, 
concurring, reasoned that “[s]tates are not bound to provide jury trials on 
demand so long as some other aspect of the process adequately protects the 
interests that Sixth Amendment jury trials are intended to serve.”142  
Similarly, Maryland courts have emphasized that “[t]he analysis of whether 
a particular procedural right is guaranteed to juveniles under the Due Process 
Clause centers on whether granting that right would help achieve or serve to 
hinder the goals of the juvenile system.”143  The juvenile process in Maryland 
neither adequately protects the interests that jury trials are intended to 
serve,144 nor does it help to achieve the goals of the juvenile system.145 
                                                          
 135.  Barry C. Feld, Punishing Kids in Juvenile and Criminal Courts, 47 CRIME & JUST. 417, 
463–64 (2018). 
 136.  Id. at 464; see also Korine L. Larsen, With Liberty and Juvenile Justice for All: Extending 
the Right to a Jury Trial to the Juvenile Courts, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 835, 866 (1994) 
(“Despite similarities between juvenile proceedings and criminal trials—both involve persons 
accused of criminal conduct and an adjudication in either could lead to incarceration—courts refuse 
to equate juvenile proceedings with a criminal trial.”). 
 137.  In re Virgil M., 46 Md. App. 654, 658, 421 A.2d 105, 107–08 (1980). 
 138.  See supra notes 124–128 and accompanying text. 
 139.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967). 
 140.  Larsen, supra note 136, at 872 (quoting Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457, 460–
61 (Ky. 1968)). 
 141.  See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 142.  403 U.S. 528, 554 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 143.  In re D.M., 228 Md. App. 451, 466, 139 A.3d 1073, 1082 (2016). 
 144.  See supra Section I.D. 
 145.  See supra Sections I.B. and I.C. 
2020] JUVENILE IN JUSTICE: A LOOK AT MARYLAND 27 
Under Maryland law, juveniles get “the worst of both worlds.”146  What 
opponents are failing to realize is that providing juveniles with another 
protection does not equate to turning the juvenile system into a fully 
adversarial process.147  Rather, by augmenting rehabilitation with due process 
protections, the juvenile court offers juveniles “treatment and protection—
the best of both worlds.”148 
This Part proceeds in three Sections.  Section A explores the ways in 
which denying juveniles the right to a jury trial violates Articles 21 and 24 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights, such as through judicial discretion,149 
conditions of confinement,150 excessive sentences,151 and the denial of all due 
process rights afforded to adults.152  Section B evaluates the policy 
justifications for allowing juveniles the right to a jury trial, including the 
arguments that the McKeiver rationale no longer applies153 and that the 
juvenile system in Maryland is not rehabilitative.154  Finally, Section C 
analyzes the arguments of three jurisdictions that allow juvenile jury trials 
and applies these arguments to Maryland law.155 
A.  Unconstitutionality of Failing to Protect Juveniles’ Fundamental 
Rights 
A jury trial adds a layer of protection between adjudication and 
disposition, allowing juveniles a greater chance of not being incarcerated in 
the first place.  First, juvenile courts have wide discretion in deciding whether 
to incarcerate a juvenile or allow them to receive services in the 
community.156  Second, harsh and punitive conditions of confinement exist 
                                                          
 146.  Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). 
 147.  See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (“There is a possibility . . . that 
the jury trial, if required . . . will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary 
process . . . .”).  For more recent opinions about the dangers of granting juveniles the right to a jury 
trial, see State ex rel. D.J., 817 So. 2d 26, 34 (La. 2002) (continuing to deny juveniles in Louisiana 
the right to a jury trial, noting that “[a]rguments claiming that particular statutory schemes are so 
punitive and have little or no rehabilitative focus so as to render McKeiver inapplicable have 
been . . . unavailing”); In re A.C., 43 A.3d 454, 461–62 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2012) (“To expand 
even further the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process by requesting jury trails in juvenile 
matters would effectively result in there no longer being a need for a separate process for them at 
all.”); State v. Chavez, 180 P.3d 1250, 1252 (Wash. 2008) (noting that jury trials are reserved for 
punitive and adversarial criminal systems, characteristics lacking in the juvenile system). 
 148.  Larsen, supra note 136, at 874. 
 149.  See infra Section II.A.1. 
 150.  See infra Section II.A.2. 
 151.  See infra Section II.A.3. 
 152.  See infra Section II.A.4. 
 153.  See infra Section II.B.1. 
 154.  See infra Section II.B.2. 
 155.  See infra Section II.C.   
 156.  Services in the community include evidence-based treatment modalities, such as 
wraparound services, functional family therapy, mental health treatment, and substance abuse 
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in DJS-operated placements.157  Third, juveniles face the risk of being 
incarcerated for a longer period of time than an adult who is convicted of the 
same offense.158  Finally, juveniles are entitled to every constitutional right 
afforded to adults, except for the fundamental right of trial by jury.159 
1.  Unfettered Judicial Discretion 
Jury deliberations—a group decision-making process—serve as a 
protection against judicial discretion and bias.160  Juvenile courts in Maryland 
control where to send a juvenile,161 meaning that juvenile court judges have 
unfettered discretion in choosing whether to even incarcerate a juvenile.162  
This judicial discretion violates Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of 
Rights because it “deprive[s]” a juvenile “of his . . . liberty” without “the 
judgment of his peers.”163  Jury trials provide a check on juvenile judges’ 
discretion.164  The Supreme Court alluded to this check when it stressed that 
the constitutional jury trial provisions echo an essential principle about the 
practice of official power in the criminal legal system and society’s hesitancy 
to allow one judge to have unlimited power, as opposed to a jury, composed 
of a group of judges.165   
A judge has a more expansive role in juvenile court proceedings than in 
adult court proceedings.166  This expansive role is not because lawmakers 
think that a judge might be more understanding and knowledgeable than a 
jury about the struggles a juvenile has gone through, but instead is based 
                                                          
counseling.  MD. DEP’T OF JUVENILE SERVS., RESIDENTIAL AND COMMUNITY-BASED SERVICES 
GAP ANALYSIS 2 (2013); see infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 157.  See infra notes 173–178 and accompanying text. 
 158.  See infra notes 188–195 and accompanying text. 
 159.  See infra notes 204–209 and accompanying text. 
 160.  See Prescott Loveland, Acknowledging and Protecting Against Judicial Bias at Fact-
Finding in Juvenile Court, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 283, 305 (2017) (“Subtle but dangerous biases 
such as situational biases . . . and implicit racial biases are ‘most likely to be uncovered—and 
corrected—by means of an interchange between individuals with conflicting perspectives, such as 
what typically occurs during a jury deliberation.’” (internal citation omitted)). 
 161.  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-19(d)(1)(iii) (West 2011).  Judges have 
discretion as to what level of care is in a juvenile’s “best interest.”  Id.  For example, a judge may 
choose to send a juvenile to a hardware secure facility or a staff secure facility but does not designate 
the individual facility that a juvenile will go to.  That is within DJS’s power.  Id. § 3-8A-19(d)(1)(ii). 
 162.  There are no mandatory or statutory maximums, so the juvenile judge is the one who 
decides whether an individual will be incarcerated or will receive services in the community.  See 
id. § 3-8A-24(a) (“[A]n order under this subtitle vesting legal custody in [a juvenile] is effective for 
an indeterminate period of time.”). 
 163.  MD. CONST. art. 24. 
 164.  See supra notes 160–163 and accompanying text.  
 165.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
 166.  See Loveland, supra note 160, at 288 (describing the judge’s role as one that is “all 
encompassing: managing the case, learning about the juvenile’s life, ruling on evidentiary disputes, 
sentencing juveniles, and also—despite all the inadmissible information the judge was privy to—
adjudicating guilt through bench trials rather than jury trials”). 
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solely on the McKeiver rationale that juries would turn juvenile proceedings 
into a fully adversarial process.167  Yet this rationale lacks merit.  Not only 
are judges more likely to convict than juries,168 but the juvenile system in 
Maryland is already fully adversarial.169  To sum up the harmful effect that 
judicial discretion plays in a disposition, the law presumes that judges acting 
as the finder-of-fact at a bench trial are skilled at setting inadmissible 
evidence from pre-trial proceedings aside and making a neutral and objective 
decision.170 
2.  Deplorable Conditions of Youth Confinement 
Since the procedures in juvenile courts are supposedly not as rigorous 
and thorough as the procedures in adult courts, there must be “limitations 
upon the conditions under which the state may confine the juveniles.”171  If 
Maryland lawmakers contend that the juvenile system is distinct from the 
criminal system, demonstrated by the fact that no legislation speaking to 
juvenile justice reform in this context has been introduced in Maryland, then 
it should necessarily be the case that the conditions of confinement in DJS-
operated facilities are distinct from conditions of confinement in Maryland 
jails.  The data, however, do not bear this out.172   
In July 2019, the Juvenile Justice Monitoring Unit (“JJMU”) described 
the Victor Cullen Center (“Cullen”)173 as having a “prison-like culture . . . 
and the absence of an overarching . . . rehabilitation model.”174  Faculty at 
Cullen did not adhere to seclusion policies.175  For example, while the youth 
                                                          
 167.  See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 168.  See Daniel Givelber & Amy Farrell, Judges and Juries: The Defense Case and Differences 
in Acquittal Rates, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 31, 48 (2008) (describing the acquittal rates between 
juries and judges, noting that “juries go from being [fifty] percent more likely to acquit when the 
defendant and a witness testify to being [ninety] percent more likely when the defendant also has 
no criminal record”). 
 169.  See infra notes 219–222 and accompanying text. 
 170.  Gary Solomon, I Got the Post-McKeiver Blues, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 107 (2007). 
 171.  Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 175 (E.D. Tex. 1973) (noting that “[t]his doctrine 
has been labelled the ‘right to treatment,’ and finds its basis in the due process clause of the 
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment” and that “[t]he commitment of juveniles to institutions under 
conditions and procedures much less rigorous than those required for the conviction and 
imprisonment of an adult offender gives rise to [these] limitations”).  For example, proponents of 
Maryland’s juvenile system may argue that because the rules of evidence do not apply at juvenile 
proceedings, the juvenile system is not as rigorous as the adult criminal system.  In re Victor B., 
336 Md. 85, 90, 646 A.2d 1012, 1014 (1994). 
 172.  See infra notes 173–181 and accompanying text. 
 173.  Cullen is a hardware secure DJS-operated facility.  MD OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., 
JUVENILE JUSTICE MONITORING UNIT (JJMU), 2019 FIRST QUARTER REPORT 8 (2019) [hereinafter 
JJMU REPORT]. 
 174.  Id. at 9. 
 175.  Id. (finding that the director of Cullen detailed that he should have given his staff members 
more clarity regarding placing youth in seclusion, as the youth who were placed in seclusion “did 
not present an imminent threat . . . at the time . . . as required by DJS policy for an authorization of 
seclusion to occur”). 
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were in seclusion, staff members did not regularly check on youth and the 
youth were not assessed by mental health or medical staff.176  At the 
Baltimore City Juvenile Justice Center (“BCJJC”), JJMU advocates found a 
lack of rehabilitation aspects.  Concerns at BCJJC included the drastic 
increase in the use of seclusion and a lack of mental health staff for the 
youth.177  At BCJJC the average daily population in the first quarter of 2019 
was 88 youth per day, but physical restraints were used 100 times, handcuffs 
and shackles were used 22 times, and solitary confinement was used 12 
times.178 
The goals of Maryland’s juvenile code and the goals of DJS state that 
youth should only be committed when absolutely necessary.179  For example, 
in 2018, the juvenile court placed 28.2% of juveniles on probation and 
committed 11.8% to DJS placement.180  Of those committed to DJS 
placement, however, the same number of children (405) were committed to 
state-operated facilities as were committed to group homes, independent 
living, foster care, intermediate care facilities for addictions, and residential 
treatment centers combined.181 
The argument that juveniles should be given the right to a jury trial 
because of their potential loss of freedom becomes even more imperative 
when we consider those 405 children committed to the most restrictive 
placements182—where solitary confinement, shackles, and physical restraints 
are common practices.183  To make matters worse, these deplorable 
incarceration conditions have a permanent and debilitating impact on 
youthful offenders, which completely undercuts any possibility for 
rehabilitation.184 
                                                          
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. at 38–39. 
 178.  Id. at 38. 
 179.  See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-15(e)(1) (West 2011) (explaining 
“[d]etention . . . may not be continued beyond emergency detention . . . unless, upon an order of 
court after a hearing, the court has found that” detention is necessary to protect the juvenile or others, 
or the juvenile is likely to leave the court’s jurisdiction); DJS STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 90, at 4 
(stating one of DJS’s goals as “only us[ing] incarceration when necessary for public safety”). 
 180.  DJS DATA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 104, at 22. 
 181.  Id. at 246. 
 182.  Just as being committed to prison, as opposed to jail, results in a greater loss of freedom, 
being committed to a more restrictive youth placement, as opposed to a less restrictive setting, 
results in a greater loss of freedom.  See Patrick McCarthy, Vincent Schiaraldi, & Miriam Shark, 
The Future of Youth Justice: A Community-Based Alternative to the Youth Prison Model, NEW 
THINKING CMTY. CORRS., Oct. 2016, at 1, 2, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250142.pdf 
(noting that a states’ dependence on “large, congregate facilities has resulted in scandalous abuses, 
unconstitutional conditions, and poor public safety outcomes almost since their inception”). 
 183.  JJMU REPORT, supra note 173. 
 184.  Lilah Wolf, Purgatorio: The Enduring Impact of Juvenile Incarceration and a Proposed 
Eighth Amendment Solution to Hell on Earth, 14 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 89, 98 (2018); see id. at 97–
98 (“Incarcerated youths’ isolation only augments the impact of maltreatment because they lack the 
human connections that encourage positive attachment and self-esteem, undermining their ability 
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In the JJMU report, the director of JJMU advised Governor Hogan, 
members of the General Assembly, and DJS that Maryland should adopt 
other jurisdictions’ practices of closing down large detention facilities and 
replacing them with rehabilitation facilities that provide youthful offenders 
with individualized treatment plans and services.185  The reality of DJS-
operated facilities is that they are punitive and subject juveniles to 
incarceration conditions that are similar to those that adults face.186  
Therefore, juveniles are constitutionally entitled to a jury trial, because 
subjecting juveniles to these incarceration conditions necessarily violates the 
Maryland constitutional provision that no one may be “imprisoned or 
disseized of his freehold liberties . . . or, in any manner, destroyed, or 
deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers.”187 
3. Juvenile Sentences Are Excessive as Compared to Adult Sentences 
The very definition of what constitutes a delinquent act is “an act which 
would be a crime if committed by an adult.”188  Yet because of indeterminate 
sentencing in Maryland’s juvenile system,189 a juvenile may serve a longer 
period of incarceration than an adult190 for the same crime.191  Juveniles can 
be incarcerated until the age of twenty-one,192 while an adult is incarcerated 
until their statutorily-defined penalty is completed.193  In Maryland, the right 
to a jury trial extends to adults who are facing at least ninety days of 
                                                          
to cope with the traumas they experience.  The personal relationships so difficult to maintain while 
incarcerated also carry a variety of other tangible benefits, for instance helping youths develop self-
control and self-confidence.”). 
 185.  JJMU REPORT, supra note 173, at v.  By rehabilitation centers that provide services, the 
director of JJMU meant that DJS should provide “a continuum of community-based care for youth 
in need of intensive services within the health care, child welfare, and juvenile justice systems.”  Id. 
at 3.  Examples include both non-residential facilities and short-term residential facilities.  Id. at 4. 
 186.  See supra notes 173–178 and accompanying text.  Like DJS-operated facilities, segregation 
is also common in Maryland jails and prisons.  See DISABILITY RIGHTS MD., BEYOND 
INCARCERATION: LOCK DOWN FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 6 (2017) (finding that Maryland 
correctional institutions’ use of solitary confinement is almost twice that of the national average). 
 187.  MD. CONST. art. 24. 
 188.  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-01(l) (West 2011). 
 189.  Cf. JJMU REPORT, supra note 173, at 12.  DJS now requires juveniles at Cullen to serve at 
least a six-month period of incarceration.  Id.  Even for those youth who have successfully 
completed the program requirements have their stay “arbitrarily extended.”  Id.  The director of 
JJMU emphasized that this form of determinate sentencing “is in direct contravention” to the policy 
rationales of having a separate juvenile justice system, because juveniles warrant the protection of 
rehabilitation and not “an approach that is exclusively punitive.”  Id.  
 190.  See MD. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., JJMU, 2019 SECOND QUARTER REPORT 5 
(2019) (concluding that “[t]he creation of a minimum time period for youth confinement reinforces 
the prison-like mentality of ‘doing time’ that is already pervasive at DJS placement sites”).  But see 
supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 191.  See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text. 
 192.  CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-8A-24(c). 
 193.  See, e.g., CRIM. LAW § 3-402(b) (enumerating that the penalty for robbery is imprisonment 
for up to fifteen years). 
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incarceration.194  Juvenile confinement often exceeds this ninety-day 
standard, as evidenced by the average length of stay of 169 days in 2018.195 
The fact that juveniles may face a longer time incarcerated than an adult 
who committed the same offense justifies that juveniles are constitutionally 
entitled to a jury trial.  Because it would be unconstitutional to deprive an 
adult of a jury trial for an offense that carries at least ninety days 
incarceration,196 it is also unconstitutional to deprive a juvenile of a jury trial 
for the same offense.  The Maryland Declaration of Rights is unambiguous 
when it states that no one may be “imprisoned . . . or deprived of his . . . 
liberty . . . but by the judgment of his peers.”197  The legislature has 
interpreted the deprivation of liberty to be “imprisonment for a period in 
excess of [ninety] days.”198  Since juveniles may be incarcerated longer than 
an adult who committed the same offense and is entitled to a jury trial, 
juveniles are constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. 
4.  Unconstitutional Denial of All Due Process Protections Afforded 
to Adults 
The importance of the jury trial in the American legal system cannot be 
overstated.  “The powers of the criminal jury were the ones our Framers were 
most adamant about safeguarding, because . . . there is a heightened need for 
protecting individual rights.”199  Even before Gault, Maryland’s highest court 
deemed that persons under the age of eighteen are protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.200  After Gault, Maryland 
extended most constitutional rights to juveniles.201 
The right to counsel is so critical in juvenile proceedings that “the 
standard for waiver of counsel in a delinquency proceeding is necessarily as 
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strict as the waiver standard that attaches in a criminal case.”202  Under Article 
21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights,203 the courts have held that 
juveniles are entitled to a speedy trial204 and fair notice.205  Due process also 
requires that juveniles enjoy the privilege against self-incrimination.206  
Further, juveniles have the right to confrontation and cross-examination,207 
as well as the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt evidentiary standard.208  
Maryland’s highest court has acknowledged that the distinctions between 
juvenile proceedings and adult criminal proceedings “have all but 
disappeared” because with the exceptions of indictment proceedings and jury 
trials, the fundamental rights afforded to adults charged with crimes apply in 
juvenile proceedings as well.209  Despite the progress that Maryland has made 
in protecting juveniles, there are still major shortcomings—the fact remains 
that juveniles are being unconstitutionally incarcerated and that they are 
afforded every single right except the right to a jury trial.210  Therefore, 
juveniles must be provided with all procedural protections that are provided 
to adults facing criminal charges. 
B.  Policy Rationales: Outdated Modalities and Punitive Measures 
Although the constitutional reasons for allowing Maryland juveniles the 
right to a jury trial should be enough to encourage the legislature to amend 
the Juvenile Causes Act, there are also strong policy arguments for allowing 
juveniles in Maryland the protection of the jury trial right.  First, it has been 
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 209.  Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 388 Md. 214, 225, 879 A.2d 695, 701 (2005). 
 210.  See supra Section II.A.2. 
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almost fifty years since McKeiver was decided and the Court’s rationale 
behind denying juveniles the right to a jury trial no longer applies.211  Second, 
the rehabilitative policies and goals promised by the Maryland General 
Assembly and the Department of Juvenile Services are not being fulfilled, 
and juveniles in Maryland are not being provided with rehabilitation.212 
1.  The Destruction of the McKeiver Principles 
Times have changed with respect to the treatment of juveniles, and the 
McKeiver rationale no longer applies.213  The realities of Maryland’s juvenile 
system trigger the concerns set out by Justice Douglas in his McKeiver 
dissent.214  Justice Douglas emphasized how even if juveniles were not 
incarcerated with adults, those juveniles were being treated as adults in the 
first instance by simply being incarcerated at all.215  This is the reality in 
Maryland almost fifty years later.216  In the past fifteen years, the Supreme 
Court has recognized “that children are constitutionally different from adults 
for purposes of sentencing,” noting that “they are less deserving of the most 
severe punishments.”217  Even though the Court’s opinions were centered 
around the death penalty and life imprisonment, the rationale applies to 
juveniles being adjudicated delinquent.218 
This is not to suggest that juvenile disposition deserves the same stature 
as capital sentencing, but the Court’s reasoning is relevant because a 
juvenile’s disposition is in effect a sentencing proceeding.219  Coupled with 
the reality that conditions of confinement are harsh and retributive, and that 
juveniles face the potential of a longer incarceration period than adults, it is 
reasonable to conclude that Maryland’s juvenile system is failing to 
recognize the Court’s standard that juveniles are less deserving of 
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punishment than adults.220  The underlying principle that McKeiver was 
decided upon—that the juvenile system is distinct from the adult criminal 
system221—has been destroyed.  Maryland needs to follow in pari materia 
with recent Supreme Court jurisprudence that juveniles are in need of more 
protection than adults.222  Maryland must also go above the federal floor by 
interpreting Articles 21 and 24 more broadly than the Fourteenth 
Amendment223 and granting juveniles the right to a jury trial. 
2.  False Picture of Rehabilitation 
The entire rationale behind the creation and maintenance of a juvenile 
system is that juveniles are in need of rehabilitation, not punishment.224  Since 
juveniles in Maryland “bargain[] away” their constitutional rights in light of 
the system’s promise of rehabilitation, the state is obligated to do just that, 
actually rehabilitate the juvenile offender.225  The juvenile delinquency laws 
in Maryland suggest that the juvenile system remains focused on 
rehabilitation,226 but the reality does not complement the laws and policies 
currently in place.227 
One does not need to be a social scientist to conclude that rehabilitation 
should reduce recidivism rates.  It seems logical when statistical analyses 
provide that states who focus on rehabilitating youthful offenders have lower 
recidivism rates for juvenile delinquent acts.228  Yet Maryland, a state that 
claims to be committed to the rehabilitation of juveniles, does not have 
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recidivism rates that reflect rehabilitation.229  In 2015, of the 1142 children 
released from committed programs, 10.5% were reconvicted within six 
months of their release, 18.7% within twelve months, 29.9% within twenty-
four months, and 35.1% within thirty-six months.230 
In 2016, 208 children were released from group homes, and 347 children 
were released from state-operated facilities.231  Of the children released from 
group homes, 40.9% of  youth were rearrested within a year of their release, 
15.4% were reconvicted, and 10.6% were reincarcerated.232  Of the children 
released from state-operated facilities, 53.6% were rearrested within a year 
of their release, 26.2% were reconvicted, and 21.0% were reincarcerated.233  
These numbers show that not only are recidivism rates for any type of 
placement in Maryland contraindicated to the supposed rehabilitation taking 
place, but the more secure (jail-like) the placement, the higher the recidivism 
rates.234  Even if one argues that the Maryland juvenile system is 
rehabilitative, it still does not lead to the conclusion that “our benevolent 
purposes justify deprivation of rights applicable to adult prosecutions.”235 
C.  Jury Trial Rights for Juveniles in Other States236 
As early as 1971, states began affording juveniles the right to a jury 
trial.237  In RLR v. State,238 the Alaska Supreme Court reasoned that the 
purposes of the right to a trial by jury applied as much in juvenile cases as it 
did in criminal proceedings.239  The court reasoned that the phrase “‘criminal 
prosecution[]’ under the Alaska constitutional jury trial [right] . . . include[d] 
any offense a direct penalty for which may be incarceration in a jail or penal 
institution.”240  The court applied this definition to RLR’s case, analyzing that 
the minor delinquent’s behaviors constituted an offense because the sale of 
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LSD is a crime under Alaska’s statutory provisions.  Further, RLR would be 
subject to incarceration upon disposition.241  The court concluded by stressing 
that to treat the “adjudicat[ory] phase of a [juvenile] proceeding for the sale 
of LSD differently from” a criminal adult proceeding for jury trial right 
purposes “would be a cynical and unprincipled refusal to obey the Alaska 
constitution.”242 
The Alaska Supreme Court held that a child who is charged with an 
offense that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult and 
subsequently subjected to incarceration, the state constitution guarantees that 
child a right to a jury trial.243  In In re L.M.,244 the Kansas Supreme Court 
held that because the Kansas juvenile code had become akin to the adult 
criminal system and was used as a punitive tool, juveniles had the state 
constitutional right to a jury trial.245  In interpreting a juvenile’s right to a jury 
trial under the Kansas Constitution, the court looked at the plain language, 
which extended the jury trial right “to all prosecutions.”246  The court had 
before understood this language to “‘mean all criminal prosecutions for 
violations of the laws of the state.’”247  Applying this precedent to juveniles, 
the court reasoned that not only did the Kansas juvenile code frequently call 
its proceedings a prosecution, but that these proceedings resulted from claims 
that a juvenile had broken the criminal laws of Kansas.248  The court 
concluded that the proceedings of the Kansas juvenile code fit within the 
meaning of “all prosecutions,” and therefore juveniles were entitled to a jury 
trial.249 
The decisions from Alaska and Kansas’s highest courts indicate a slow-
moving trend among the states to grant juveniles the right to a jury trial, but 
a trend, nonetheless.  Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights 
mirrors the language of both the Alaska and Kansas Constitutions that have 
been the ground for granting juveniles the right to a jury trial.  Therefore, the 
reasoning applied by the courts in these two jurisdictions should be applied 
to Maryland law, because the very definition of a delinquent act in Maryland 
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is “an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult.”250  Further, just 
as Alaska’s highest court has held that “contemporary social values rather 
than historical categorizations determine whether a prosecution is criminal 
for purposes of the right to jury trial,”251  Maryland’s highest court has 
reasoned that “the Maryland cases have determined whether a juvenile 
proceeding should be treated as a criminal prosecution for purposes of a 
specific right guaranteed by Maryland law.”252 
Like the Kansas Constitution, Article 21 of the Maryland Constitution 
provides “[t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right . . . to a 
speedy trial by an impartial jury.”253  The Maryland Court of Appeals has 
interpreted the phrase “all criminal prosecutions” to “guarantee[] a right that 
is absolute in the sense that it applies to all criminal prosecutions or . . . to the 
prosecution of every crime.”254  As Article 21 is parallel in language to both 
the Alaska and Kansas Constitutions, and because both of these jurisdictions 
granted juveniles the right to a jury trial on state constitutional grounds, it is 
reasonable for Maryland to follow this line of reasoning and grant juveniles 
the right to a jury trial.255  The policy arguments emphasized in In re L.M. are 
also applicable to Maryland’s modern juvenile system.256 
Although Maryland’s juvenile statutory scheme does not refer to 
juvenile proceedings as criminal prosecutions,257 the specific terminology 
used does not make a difference because the proceedings themselves operate 
as a criminal prosecution.258  Before McKeiver was decided, the Supreme 
Court of New Mexico held in Peyton v. Nord259 that “[a] juvenile charged 
with violation of a state law . . . is entitled to a trial by jury in juvenile 
court.”260  The court reasoned that when the state constitution was adopted, 
Albert Peyton could not have been sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
without a jury trial.261  Based on this historical context, the court declared that 
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a mere “change in terminology or procedure” was not commensurate with a 
court denying Albert a jury trial and subsequently sentencing him to 
incarceration.262 
Like juveniles in New Mexico at the time of the adoption of the state 
constitution, juveniles in Maryland, at the time of the adoption of the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights, had the right to a jury trial.263  Therefore, 
the fact that juveniles had the right to a jury trial at the time of the adoption 
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights logically takes precedent over what 
the state legislature has chosen to call juvenile proceedings.  Maryland needs 
to follow in line with states like Alaska, Kansas, and New Mexico, and grant 
juveniles the right to a jury trial. 
III.  CONCLUSION  
Juvenile incarceration in Maryland is so egregious and punitive that one 
young child died after being restrained by DJS staff.264  In 2007, seventeen-
year-old Isaiah Simmons, III died at a staff secure facility after being 
restrained by staff members.265  Disguised under a false premise of 
rehabilitation, with softer terminology and non-punitive policies, Maryland’s 
juvenile system is harmful for Maryland youth because it has resulted in 
“judges ruling for fewer procedural protections for juveniles.”266  In 
Maryland the right to a jury trial is so critical that “[t]o satisfy constitutional 
due process standards, the waiver of the right to a jury trial must constitute 
an intentional relinquishment.”267  Yet children today are denied this 
fundamental right. 
 Each injustice discussed in this Comment—judicial discretion in 
placing the child,268 conditions of confinement,269 excessive sentences,270 and 
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being denied all due process rights afforded to adults271—is by itself enough 
to extend the constitutional protection of jury trials to juveniles.  Yet taken in 
the aggregate, the reality becomes undeniably clear that juveniles are entitled 
to a jury trial under Articles 21 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 
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